

Separation of Powers in Contemporary Iran: From Imported Idea to Indigenous Architecture of Power

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1. Round 1

1.1. Reviewer 1

Reviewer:

The paragraph discussing Ackerman (2010) and Shia-Ali and Zare (2017) introduces theoretical perspectives but lacks a coherent linkage to Iran's hybrid model. Please synthesize these theories into a unified conceptual framework rather than listing them descriptively.

When discussing Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws*, please include a direct quotation or page reference to demonstrate textual engagement rather than secondary citation through Shapiro (2001).

The subsection provides a strong narrative on Locke and Montesquieu but omits modern reinterpretations such as those in regulatory state theory or executive dominance models. Consider including contemporary perspectives post-2000 to show theoretical continuity.

The paragraph beginning "From the perspective of the constitutional jurists of the Islamic Republic..." conflates "independence" and "functional overlap." It would be clearer to distinguish constitutional autonomy (*de jure*) from political interdependence (*de facto*).

Authors revised the manuscript and uploaded the document.

1.2. Reviewer 2

Reviewer:

The literature review is historically rich but largely descriptive. It would benefit from a critical analysis identifying gaps in existing scholarship, such as limited empirical evaluations of the Guardian Council's moderating role or the absence of comparative Islamic constitutional analysis.

The sentence "These historical developments spurred social and political mobilization toward building legal institutions..." should be supported with specific examples—e.g., constitutional articles or key Majles debates—to strengthen historical grounding.

The article cites Aristotle but doesn't clearly distinguish between ancient division of labor and modern institutional separation. A clearer conceptual distinction would help delineate the evolution of the term and avoid anachronistic interpretations.

The statement "These mechanisms—occasionally perceived as interference—constitute a localized adaptation of the separation of powers model..." is insightful but needs empirical backing. Include citations from constitutional debates, case examples, or academic critiques illustrating these "interferences."

The paper claims a comparative and analytical method, yet comparison is limited to Western vs. Iranian models. To substantiate the comparative claim, integrate at least one additional Islamic context (e.g., Pakistan or Egypt) where separation of powers interacts with religious authority.

The conclusion that "this hybrid structure has sometimes led to a concentration of authority..." is valid but underexplored. Please expand with concrete examples—perhaps citing specific constitutional crises or political cases—to demonstrate this concentration empirically.

Authors revised the manuscript and uploaded the document.

2. Revised

Editor's decision: Accepted.

Editor in Chief's decision: Accepted.